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':37 .S 9
3 June 195 9.
1. ·~e First National Bank of Ironclad was the holder of an unsecured note in the
amount of $10 1 000, signed by Muskrat. Upon the bank's request Muskrat executed a
deed of trust upon an unimproved lot to secure this debt, which deed of trust was
immediately recorded. Muskrat then undertoe~ to erect a building upon this lot. He
employed Shoestring Construction Co., a general contractor, to erect the building.
Shoestring completed the construction of the building and, upon Muskrat's failure to
pay, perfected a mechanic 1 s lien in the amount of :IJ)lO,OOO within the requisite sixtyday period. Muskrat has become insolvent. In an appropriate suit to enforce the
mechanic's lien, the court fixed the value of the vacant lot as of the date of sale
at $5,000. At the sale the property brought $12 1 000.
As between Bank and Shoestring, how should the purchase price be divided?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) V#43-21 the recorded deed of trust of the unimproved land is a
first claim on the land and a second claim on subsequently erected buildings, and
the mechanic's lien is a first claim on the improvements that gave rise to the lien
and a second claim on the land reasonably necessary for the proper enjoyment of the
building. So Bank receives :$5,000 and Shoestring receives ~P7 ,000.
q. ~q

2.~n 1~55,

Ghastly bought an orchard in Clarke County,Va., subject to a certain
deed of trust for $20 1 000 1 which deed of trust had been executed a number of years
previously to secure a note, in the same amount, payable to Shark. As a part of the
purchase price, Ghastly assumed and bound himself to pay the balance due on the
$20,000 note , with interest as it became due . During his lifetime Ghastly made pay-
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menta on the note with the result that at the time of his death in 1958, the total
amount of the indebtedness had been reduced to $16,000. The orchard was devised to
Fiend by Ghastly's will, the will making no specific mention of the indebtedness of
Ghastly on the note secured by the deed of trust, nor did the will direct the executor to pay the · note. Fiend contends that the balance due on the note secured by
the deed of trust should be paid out of Ghastly's personal estate. The general
legatees of Ghastly's personal estate contend that the real estate remained the
principal source for the payment of the lien indebtedness and that the persomal
estate was only secondarily liable therefor. A suit in equity has been filed in the
Circuit Court of Clarke County for determination of this question.
How should the court rule?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS--WILLS) Fiend is correct. A secured debt is a debt and the first
property taken to pay debts (unless the deceased provides otherwise)is personal
property at large not otherwise disposed of. Fiend is a specific devisee and a
specific devise is the last thing taken to pay debts. See 185 Va.l60 on p.l707 of
Wills in these Notes.
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8. Groundhog, a farmer, obtained a $25,000 loan from Merchants Bank, for which he
executed his note, payable in 60 days, with his brother, Ferret, as accommodation
endorser. Later Ferret learned that Groundhog was insolvent and he induced Groundhog
to execute a deed of trust on his house to secure Ferret as endorser on said note.
Said trust was promptly recorded. At the time he obtained the loan from Merchants
Bank, Groundhog had a number of unsecured creditors. Upon learning of the trust
that Groundhog had given upon his property to Ferret, the unsecured creditors consult you and inquire whether the deed of trust to Ferret may be successfully
attacked as voluntary and fraudulent and as creating a preference. What would you
ac;ivise?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) I would advise .that it could not be attacked. The debt is a real
one as the accommodation indorser is liable and will have to pay. It makes no
difference whether Groundhog secures the Bank or the endorser. At common law one
may prefer one bona fide creditor to another. Since Groundhog is a farmer he cannot
be thrown into involuntary bankruptcy and the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act concerning preferences have no application. See 200 S.E.629,633 on p.200 of Bankruptcy
Cases in these notes.
/) 5" 1
3 December, 1959
1. .ver Sniftless was an electrician at the Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia,
earning $85 a week. In August,l959, as a gesture of brotherly love, he delivered
to his unmarried sister, Neva Shiftless, a birthday gift of ten U.S. bonds payable
to bearer, each in the denomination of $100. At that time,his financial affairs were
in good order, although he owed Grocer a bill of $200. In September, Shiftless fell
out of bed at home, seriously injuring his back. The bill of Hospital was so great
that he was unable to meet his obligations and became hopelessly insolvent.
Both Grocer and Hospital desire to subject the bonds to payment of their respective debts, and they ask you {a)whether the gift was void as to Grocer,(b)whether
the gift was vo;Ld as to Hospital, and (c)whether in a suit to set aside the gift
Shiftless could successfully plead as a defense that they had not obtained judgments
against him.
How should you advise them as to (a),(b), and (c)?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS)(a) .The gift is void as to Grocer. By V#55-81 voluntary gifts are
void as to those creditors of the donor who are owed debts at the time of the gift,
regardless of the solvency or insolvency of the donor at that time.(b) The gift is
not void as to Hospital, as Hospital was not then a creditor of Shiftless, nor was
the gift made to defraud anticipated creditors.(c) By V#55-82 no judgment need be
obtained as a condition precedent to avoid the gift.
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3 June 1960.
1. Debtor owned and operated Blackacre, a large dairy farm in Wythe County, Va.
On January 2, 1958, he executed a deed of trust on Blackacre to secure Adams
$10,000, which was promptly and duly recorded.
At the April, 1959, term of Wythe Circuit Court, Best obtained a judgment against
Debtor for $5,000. This judgment was not docketed, and at the June,l959, term of
this court, Clark obtained and docketed a judgment for $8,000. On August 4,1959,
Davis, to whom Debtor owed a note for $7,500, asked Debtor to secure this note or
pay it. Debtor said: "I can't pay it but I will give you a deed of trust. There is
one deed of trust on the farm now and some judgments against me. You can look about
these at the Courthouse but I will give you the deed of trust." The next day Davis
went to the Clerk's Office and found that the Best judgment had been obtained but
that it was not docketed. He made no further investigation or inquiry and that day
Debtor executed the deed of trust to secure the $7,500 note. This deed of trust was
promptly recorded.
Debtor a.Lso owed $10,oo'o in open accounts.
Which, if any, of these debts are liens against Blackacre and what is their
priority?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Applying the. following principles(a)vfuere everything else is
equal prior in time is prior in right,(b)Docketing is not necessary as between
ereditors,(c)One who purchases land(and a deed of trust creditor is a purcha,s er)
with actual notice of a prior lien takes subject thereto, and(d) While judgment
creditors have liens, open account general creditors do not, we find that all of the
debts, except the open account onas, are liens against Blackacre and that the order
of priority is Adams, Best, Clark, and Davis.

Q.l on p.500(Creditors Rights). The former rule that docketing is unnecessary as
between creditors is no longer law due to a change in V#B-386 to the effect that a
judgment is not a lien on realty until it is recorded(docketed) on the judgment lien
docket of the clerk's office of the county or city in which the land is situated.
The Adams lien is first because it is a duly recorded first deed of trust, Clark is
second because he has docketed his judgment thereby giving constructive notice to
subsequent parties, Davis is next because of his duly recorded second deed of t~1st ~
So far Best and the open account creditors are on a par, but if Best dockets his
judgment he will have priority as of that time unless in the meantime other liens
have been perfected.

~

bee ember
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1~ Will Worker worked for ~ llW!lber of yeat! in a smalls tore in Lynchburg, Va. He had
managed to put his only sort through colle~e and had built up a small savings
accolinU He now yearned to lead a more exciting life. Fast Buck, a friend who lived
on the Eastern Shor~ of Virginia, induced Will to invest in his racing stable. Will
Worker, using th~ $6,000 he had in the bank and $4,000 he borrowed from his son,
invested $10,000 in the stable. The venture was prosperous for a while, but then
began to fail. Will Worker soon realized he was insolvent in the sense that he
didn't have the present ability to pay his creditors if they pressed for prompt
payment, but he felt reasonably sure his creditors would forebear. Will Worker
owned a small farm in Campbell County Virginia, which was valued at $4,000,and whi~
he conveyed to his son in satisfaction of the debt due him, saying, "In case I go
breke I want to make sure you get paid."
Henry Smith, a creditor of Will Worker learned of the conveyance to Son, and within
sixty days of same filed a bill in equity in the proper jurisdiction to have the
above conveyance set aside and declared null and void on the €rOUnd that it was in
fraud of Will's creditors.
Will's son cornea to you seeking advice. What would you
advise him?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) I would advise him that his father had the right to prefer one
bona fide creditor over another. There is nothing fraudulent in paying and receiving
what is honestly due.(Note that the question asks nothing about possible bankruptcy
proceedings.) 9 M.J.,Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances #41.
bD
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3 June 1961.

1,.">b n F'ebruary of 196o, an automobile driven by Hyram Jones collided with one driven
by John Apple at the intersection of Ninth and Main Streets in the City of Richmond.
Each party claiming the other was at fault, no settlement of the controversy could
be made. On Nov.3,1960, Apple brought an action against Jones in the Law an ,;!£quity
Court of the City of Richmond seeking damages of $50,000 allegedly sustaineJ py him
as a result of the collision. Jones promptly filed a counterclaim asking da..tges of
$40,000. In January of 1961 Jones, being advised by· his lawyer that he had ~ a
fifty per cent chance of winning the case, by the execution and delivery of ~ppro
priate instruments made a gift to his wife Sally of all his property, excepting only
his interest in the home place which was held by him and Sally as tenants by the
entireties. On June 8,1961, the case between Apple and ,Jones was tried and the jury
returned its verdict for Apple in the sum of $h5,ooo. On this verdict, judgment was
duly entered.
Apple, having learned of the gift made by Jones to Sally, and understanding that
Jones has insufficient assets to satisfy the judgment, asks your advice on what
grounds, if any, he might bring a suit in equity to have the gift made by Jones to
Sally set aside.
What should you advise him?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Apple may have the gift set aside on either or both of two
grounds. It was a fraudulent conveyance since:..made with the intention of hindering,
delaying, or defrauding creditors, and it was~~oluntary ~conveyance void as to' existing creditors by statute(V#55-8l)whether or not he retained sufficient assets and
whether or not the claim against him was liquidated or unliquidated.

Q. 1 on p.562(b) The law stated in this portion of the answer is changed by the
which allows a security interest in inventory(shifting stock of merchandise)
provided that .a proper financing statement is filed. Even if such a statement is
filed, a purchaser of inventory in the ordinary course of the seller's business is
protected even if the purchaser has actual knowledge of the security interest.

u.c.c.

•

. (
. 3 D~cember 1961.
.
1.P{gThomas Tobias owed many debts totalling $)0 ,000. Tob1.as made a ge~ral asslgnment for the benefit of his creditors, conveying to a trustee all of hls property.
The property held by the trustee was sufficient in value to pay all of ~o~ias' debts,
including the cost of any suit that mjght be brought/ to enforce and admlnlster the
trust. The trustee failed to act with promptness in the administration of the trust
and Hobson one of •r obias' creditors, instJ.tuted a chancery suit for the purpose of
enforcing the trust. 'l'he ot her credi tors vrere made , parti~s t~ t~1is su~ t, a~d the
litigation was protracted. Dur·i ng the pendency of 0he su1. t, fobJ.as 1 mfe ~led testate and by her will she devised to her husband all of her real es~ate hanng a.
value of $25,000. Shortly after her death, and before t he conclus1on ?f the chancery suit to enforce the tru.r.;t, Hobson obtained a judgment against Tob1.as and sought
to enforce satisfaction of the judgment by a suit instituted for the purpose of selling the real estate acquired by Tobi as from his wif e. Tobias co~sults yo1:l' and inquires whether Hobson may maintain the suit to sell the land acqmred by h1m from
his wife in view of the pendency of the prior suit against the trustee to enforce

547.

trust f or the benefit of Hobson and the other creditors.
In the absence of a statute controlling the rights of the parties what would
yo1.1. advi se?
( Cii.EDITORS RIGHTS) I would advi s e Tobias that Hobson is acting properly. When
Hobson became a judgment creditor he obtained a lien on Tobi as ' after-acquired
r Galty. He can enforce his lien on this realty W"hether or not he has other methods
or collecting as long as he does not re ceive more than hi s debt from both sources.
Even if the doctri ne of electi on did apply, it would not be applicable here as the
ori ginal ci:::·cumstances have changed. He could not be expected to elect Hhethe r he
Hould go after the trustee, or after the l and until Tobias had t he latter. See 99
Va . 163.
t1r.e

•

1:~ ;v
page 562.
3 June 1962 ..
1. John Barter, an automoblie dealer in Richmond,Va., attempted to purchase for resale fifty new Chevrolets from General Motors, but his purchase order was refus ed
because the balance due on his open account for automobiles previously bought from
General Motors stood at $75,000 and was six months past due. In order to make the
purchase, Barter issued his check to General Motors for $75,000 to pay off the
balance of the old account. Barter knew t~t he had no money in the bank, and, upon
presentation by General Motors, the check was dishonored.
In his subsequent discussions with General Motors, Barter disclosed that his
business had been failing and that he was insolvent. However, he assured General
Motors that if it would hold off proceedings against him for thirty days, he would
make good the $75,000 check. General Motors assented to that proposition.
Barter then described his plight to his rich aunt, Henrietta Ford. Mrs. Ford
loaned him $75,000, taking as evidence thereof Barter's demand note in that amount,
secured by a deed of trust, duly recorded, on the stock of automobiles held fer
sale in his business. Using the money he obtained from Mrs. Ford, Barter took up
the dishonored check from General Motors.
E.Z .Mark, one of Barter 1 s chief creditors, had recently obtained judgment against
Barter and had leviJed on the automobiles. Learning of Barter's transactions with
General Motors and Mrs.Ford, Mark consults you and asks you what rights, if any, he
has enforceable in the State court(a)against General Motors and (b)to set aside t te
Henrietta Ford deed of trust. How should you advise him as to (a) and (b)?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS)(a) As far as State law is concerned a debtor may prefer one bona
fide creditor over another, so that Mark has no remedy against General Motors in a
State court.(b) A deed of trust on a shifting stock of merchandise is void in
Virginia as to purchasers in due course and creditors. Mrs. Ford, by leaving Barter
in charge has given him the power to sell off the merchandise and defeat all creditors. "From Levy v. Lee, 3 Rand. 410, decided in 1825, until the present time, it
has b~en uniformly held by this court that such a mortgage ~~ on a stock of goods,
wares and merchandise *** which contains provisions adequate to defeat its purposes,
is null and void as against creditors and purchas~rs' of the grantor. The cases
are too numerous to cite" Judge .Eurks in Boice v. Finance etc. 127 Va.563.

·~

I

~G. I
2 . .V Bass filed a bill in equity against Trout in the Circuit Cou!'t of Culpeper County, Virginia, on behalf of himself and all lien creditors of Trout. The lien crE'dHors of Trout >Tere made parties defendant to the bill. In the bill of complai.:-:.t
Bass averred that he had obtained a judgment against Trout , in the sum of $6,000,
in the County Court of Culpeper County, and that said judgment had been duly docketed in the judgment lien docket of the Circuit Court of that County. An abstract of
said judgment was filed with the bill of complaint as an eYJlibit. The lien creditors of Trout, who had been made parties defendant , ans1rrered the bill of complaint
and joined in the prayer thereof that the cause be referred to a Master Commissioner
in Chancery to ascertain and report the Hen debts in the order of their priori ties,
and that the real properties of Trout , subject to the liens of his creditors, be
sold for the payment of the lien debts.
Trout demurred to the bill of complaint upon the ground that the alleged judgment
of the plaintiff in the amount of $6,000 <Jas vcid , and that the court was without
jurisdict-ion to enter tain the suit. The trial court over:r'Uled the demurrer, and the
cause was referred to a Master Commi ss ioner 1,.1ho reported the liens in the order of
their priorities, and that the rents and profits would not pay the debts in f ive
years. Among debts reported as liens VJas t he $6 ;000 claim of Bass.
Upon exceptions to the Commissioner's report, the t6al court held that the
judgment obtained by Bass vms void, but aVJarded judgment t o Bas s for $6,000 in t he
creditor's suit, as it appeared to the court from evidence returned with the Commissioner's report that Trout was indebt ed to Bass i n the sum of ~i6,ooo . The court
further dec reed the sale of Trout's properttes and directed th&t:. the net proceeds
of tho sale be applied to the po.yment of all of 'l'rout t s lien creditors , including
the claim of Bass. Upon an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals Trout contended:
(a) That the demurrer should have been sustained on the gvound that the court was
without juri sdiction to entertain the suit at t he instance of Bass;
(b) That the trial cour t erred in awarding judgment to Bass; and
(c) That the court erred i n de cr eeing the sale of Trout 1 s properties.
How should the court rule on each of these r:ontentions?
( CPF.I'ITCBS RIGHTS) (a) 'rhis contention should not be sustai ned because the lien
creditors of Trout are now properly before the court and tl1ey have a r ight to have
the matter decided. Had Bass been the onl.y person involved tl1e demurrer VJould
have been proper since the complaint shows on its face that Bas s has no lien.
(b) This contention is correct. Bass hCJ.s no standing t o invoke the assistance of a
conrt of equity to foreclose the lien of his judgment until he obtaj_ns a valid judgment. The maximum jurisdictional a'T!ount of a county court is $2,000. Obtaining
the jud gment is a purely ler,al matter.
(c) There is no error here as the lien creditors in the case are ent itled to the
relief asked for. See 171 Va. 19h.

••
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" ·:r-3 December 1962.
l.rtJones, unmarried, owns (l)a residence, (2) shares of stock in a Virginia corporation, and (3) a savings account in a local bank. He owe.:r:J your client $3,000,
evidenced by a past duo note.
How, i f at all, may this property be subjected to thC' payment of client's debt,
asswning that both your client and Jones a>:-e residents of Virginia.
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Get a judgment against Jones. This judgment is a lien on his
residence. File a bill in equity to enforce the lien of the judgment. See v#B-391.
As to the shares of stock they may be levied upon and seized or, they may be reached by equitable process aided by injunction if needed. See Burks Pleading and
Practice(4th Ed.) pp.694 and 695 and V#l3 .1-413 and 414. 'l'he bank account may be
reached by garnishment proceedings.

•

•

1\,~rown, on April 1,1962, obtained jndgm ~r..-~ in the CirGuit Cout"t of Wythe County', ··
aga1nst Carson for $1,2$0. This judgm~nt was promptl;,.- docketed and an executi<.·~l.
returnable in ninety days. issued thereon and went into the hands of the Sheriff
~·;ay 1,1962 • Carson, a fannel', owned real estate encumbered for more than its value;
be also owned five pure-bred steers worth approximately $2,000 and a well-drilling
outfit worth $1,000. On Nay ~,1962, Carson executed and recorded a deed of trust on
the steers and well-drilling outfit to secure ratably $2,500 owed to his wife and
$1,000 owed to a bank for money which he had borrowed from them. On June 7,1962
the Sheriff levied the execution on all the personal property mentioned above. '
Assuming that homestead exemption is waived as to all these debts, what are the
priorities, if any, and rights of (a)Brown, (b) the wife, and (c) the bank?
(CREDI'l'ORS RIGHTS). The lien of an execution on personal property is effective when
the writ of fieri facias is placed in the hands of the proper officer, in this
case, May 1, even as against a bona fide purchaser for value in the case of tangible
personal property. Thus Brown has priority. The Bank and the Wife come next equally
and ratably since both debts were bona fide debts. See Burks Pleading and Practice
(4th Ed. )#370.

4~ @holesaler•s Incorporated recovered a judgment against Easy Credit. A writ of

fieri facias was issued thereon and placed in the hands of the Sheriff for levy,
being returnable on June 14,1963. Before the return date the Sheriff made
a levy on all pers 9na~ property in Easy Credit's Office. Easy Credit before the levy,
but after the w:i:it had been placed in the hands of the Sheriff, and sold to Joe
Hock for $500 an antique clock kept in the office. At the time of the sale, Hock
knew nothing of the judgment of Wholesaler's Incorporated or of the writ of~
facias. On June 12,1963, the Sheriff levied on the clock in possession of Hock.
May the Sheriff now sell the clock free of the claim of Hock1
5'93 ..
('~ ~ED::: TOHS RIGHTS) Yes. Burks Pleading and P:racUce #373 of the fourth edition :c e.?.r l~
i l'l part, "Tangibla property. In Virginia, i f the property is capable of bdnt?; l e.vi ~d
on~ the liem of the fi. ra. is superio:r to the rj_ghts of purcha.sarswi::::"thor-wi t hoi:\·:;
P.ot i~ e of the fi. fa-, provided a levy is actually made on or before the return day
of the writ.•1 'TFie lien of the fi. fa. a·i:.tached when the writ of fieri faci.s.G was
d.J:l.ivered to the officer to beexe'Cuted. V/18-411 and 8-h13.
~it
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3 December 1963.
1 .D samuel Pepys, the sole proprietor of a drug store in Waynesboro, Va., was heavily
indebted to Albert Rexall one of his suppliers who was engaged in business in the
City of Richmond. Pepys became increasingly-delinquent in paying his bills and
Rexall, fearing that Pepys might ultimately become insolvent, on November 1,1963
obtained from Pepya a chattel mortgage to secure payment to him of Pepys' indebtedness. The chattel mortgage, which was duly recorded by Rexall on the afternoon of
November 1st, recited the transfer to Rexall of all merchandise then in the drug
store, provided that foreclosure could be made if the indebtedness was not paid on
or prior to December 2nd, and further provided that Pepys in the meanwhile could
continue the operation of his drug store in the usual manner.
Pepys having paid nothing on the indebtedness, on December 4th Rexall went to
waynesboro for the purpose of foreclosing the chattel mortgage. On his arrival in
Waynesboro, Rexall learned that on November 29th, Geoffrey Chaucer had obtained a
judgment against Pepys, that the Sheriff in execution of the fieri facias issued on
the judgment had levied on all Pepys 1 merchandise, and that t~eriff had advertised the merchandise for sale at public auction on December 16th. Rexall promptly brought a suit against both Chaucer and the Sheriff in the Circuit Court of the
City of Waynesboro in which his bill in chancery alleged the foregoing facts,and
prayed that an injunction be granted to prevent the Sheriff's sale of the merchandise. Chaucer and the Sheriff have each demurred to the bill. How should the Court
rule on the demurrers?
. OJ.v.
(CREDITORSRIGHTS) The demurrers should be sustained. The chattel mortgage was void
as ~o Pep?s' creditors because it allowed Pepys to keep full control of the property
and· sell ~t in the regular course of business. Un:ier such circwnstances there is no
·reason
why Rexall should ·be any better off than Pepys' other creditors. Benedict v.
1
Ratner 268 u.s.353.

_,.,_<

3 June 1964.
Spector owns a farm worth $10,000, a television set vmrth $'700, an automobile worth $2,800, and a diamond brooch worth ~$1,000. He owes Small Los.n Co. $300,
has doctors' bills amounting to $500, and unpaid grocery bill of $600, and he OvJes
Discount House, Inc., $3~000. None of these credi~rs have reduced their claims to
judgment. Discount House, Inc., threatens to comrrJence an action to recover the
$3,000 due it, and to avoid this action Spector transft:Jrred to Discotmc House, Inc.,
the title of his automobila in exchange for a release and satisfaction of this obligation. Spe~tor~ out of J.ove and af.fe~tion, gave his da•1ght.er the diamond brooch
and, in order to put his farm beyond the reach of his creditors, he conveyed his
farm to his son in exchange for the son 1 s worthless shares of st~ck in the Toonerville Trolley R.s.ihray Company, a defunct corporation. Six months after all of the
foregoing transactions, Frank Foolish lent to SpGctor $3gOOO, and ·t.hereafter Spector
made a gift of his t~;levision set to his own wife. Socn thereafter Foolish demanded
payment of the ~S) _,OOO and was sho~ked to learn that Svce:tor had no ass et.s. FooEsh
consults you and inquires wtu:::ther he may rec:J.ch any of the assets formerly owned by
Spector. What 1v-ould you. acl.vis~·l
(CREDITORS RIGH1'S) I ·t-iould a.d\'~. se th8 B'oclish can reach the television set that
Spector gave to his wife as su;;;h a volliilt.a:::-y gift is void in Virgin:i.a as to existing
creditors whether or not the donor is still s olvent after having made the gift. He
can also reach the $10 11 000 .fc:.::m as that \.Vas conveyed with intent tm defraud credi torr
and is void in Virginia as to all credH.ors vrhether present or subsequent. He cannot
reach the di2111ond brooch becaur;e he was not a cre:di tor of Spe•-::tor a-li that time. He
cannot reach the automobile . be·; ;ause i:1 Virginia one has the right to prefer one
bona fide creditor to another. See #/fol09~. and l096 of Minor on Real Property(Ribble)
h ; ttJ se ~l.

"

2 .Jf.b~n~ and Sa7ings Bank , Inc., recovered a judgment in the Circuit Court of Albermarle County, Vaop ag:.rinst 1JI!illiam Frail :i..n th<; sum of $l2 »000, and consults you,
requesting that you advise whether tha judgment is colle<':tible . Upon investigation
you fir.d that Frail owns no property, but that six months before you were consulted
he was struck by an auto:nobile while walking on a sidt::N'alk in Charlottesville, and
as a result he sustained serious bodily inJuries. 'l'he oper:a:to::- of the automobile was
Maggie Smith, Frail ' s mother-in~ la-w, a '-: <::alt,hy wtdow. Upon reporting your findings
to Loan and Savings Bank, Inc., you are asked whether the Bank may tc:Ll<:e any ao tion
against Maggie Smith to effe;Jt collection of its judgment a gainst Frail.
What would you advise'l
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) I would advi1:1e that Bank has no recourse a gainst Haggie Smith,
A cause of action for personal i nj u.:riDs cannot be assignf::d, attached, or garnished
but is purely personal in nature. See #57 of Burks Pleaclj.ng and Practice(4th Ed.).

3 December 196L.
1. Bill Crenshaw had been trcding with J oe Dudley for severa.l years by selling auto ...
mobile tires and accessories to him. Dudley had one place of business, and a sign
on the door read 11 Joe Dudley and Cvmpany-"·D5.scount Tire a::1d Auto Acc e ssories."
Fred Finley, Dudley's father-in-law, in fact, owned t b.\3 bm:;iness, and Dudley was
only paid a sa.lary and commission, but there was no indication of this on the door
or on any signs or s tationery nor had there bee n publication of any notic e or any
recordation in any clerk's off ice. However, when Cren::;hm.;r first started dealing
with Dudley, he asked why Dudley used the term 11 and Company_. 11 B.nd Dudley said,
1:My father-in- l aw, Fred Finley, i3 J."eally behind all t his. I am just a lackey."
The business fell so far behind in paying its debts owed to Cr ~nshaw that Crenshaw
brought suit and obtained a judgment against Joe Dudley on whieh execution was
levie,d on all the property of the business and its a:.~counts receivable. Fred
Finley, thereupon , in proper proceet~.ings .• e.sse:c ted. hi.s title to all the property,
claiming to be the true owner ther e')f .
Is Crenshaw entitled to enfo:;:-co his lien against the business property on his
judgment againt::t Dudley?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS ) Yes. V~L~5-l52(the Traders Act ) wns not r.vr.~plied with by notices
in writing posted in the stor e and publice,t.ion of notice r.s ~Jet fo rth in the
statute . Knowlsdge of the true situa~ion is :bn..'ll.atierial if there has been no
compliance. See V#SS-152 and anno t atio ns thereto.

•

3 June Exam 1965.
1. Ambitious owned several building lots in the rapidly growlng town of Boom, Va.
Desiring to acquire more land Ambitious borrowed from Industrial Bank $20,000 and
secured its repayment by a mortgage conveying to Indus·~rial by metes and bounds de3cription the building lots then owned by him and also ~•an other real estate which I .,
Ambitious, may acquire during the life of the mortgage". This mortgage was properly
recorded. Later Ambitious bought an off5.ce building in Boom and while the foregoing
mortgage securing Industrial was outr;tanchng, scld it to Purchaser. Along came a
depression <md suit W·9.8 institut ed to foreclose the mortgage on the lots and office
building. Purchaser intervened and claimed that his ·i:,:Ltle vras superior to the rights
of Industrial as to the ofEce building. How Ollght t he Cotn··J; to hold?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Purchaser's title is superior . The recorded mortg3.ge.:~ as far as
the office building is concerned, is outside the chain of '!:.itle and hence not constructive notice to Purchaser. He was under no duty to s e e whether or not Ambitious
had mortgaged the office building before A..Yl;bitious had any interest. therein. See
3 Glenn on Mortgages 414.
5£ ~/

•

2. Debtor executed and properly record ed a deed o f trus t conveying Blackacre to secure Bank the payment of a loan evid enced by his note f or jPS,OOO due one year after
date. This debt wc:.s paid at maturity and the note 1<.ras marked n(;;a ncelled 11 by Bank
and delivered to Debtor. The deed of trust "t<Jas not released of record. One Year
later Debtor, being in financiP..l diffict.~lties a ppli 8d tc Bank for another loan of
~~5, 000 which was granted and the parties agreed that it s hould be secured by the old
de ed of trust and so endors ed to that effect on the note. Behreen the times of these
t~vo transactions CI'editor had obtained and prcperly docke t e d a judgment against
De btor for $4,000. Debtor o-vmP.d no property exc e pt Bla cka cre and it Has worth only
$ 6,000. What are the respective ri ghtc of Ba nk and Creditor as r e spects Blackacre or
the proceeds from its sale?
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) Creditor has priority over Bank. When the first $5,000 note was
paid the debt was discharged and th e s ecuri ty for it abso l utely ceased. It was dead.
Bank should have released the de ed of t n 1s t, and cannot stand in a better position
because of its failure to do Hhat it s hould have done. Soo 1 Gle nn on Mortgages 328o

3 December 1965
1. Blackacre, the home of H and w, had be~n acquired hy them in 1960 as __tenants by _
the entirety wi"l:,h tM right of sur •r:ivors hlp as a t common laH. In Januru: y 1965, they
sold Blaclcacre to Richa rd Ro e and H directed tha t the net pr oce7ds of the sale be
.
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2. Debtor borrowed $15,000 from A and gave as security a deed of trust on his farm
in Roanoke County, Va. Although the deed of trust recited t hat the ind ebtedness wn.s
evidenced by a promissory note of even date executed by Deb L.o r for $15,000, paya.'ble
to A 90 days after date, no such m t e was ever delive J.~ r;-:l to A. The deed of t rt'.SC
was properly signed, acknowledged and dehvered by Debt or to A on t he day he r eceived the money, and A duly recorded it that day in the Clerkis Office of the
CirC!uit Court of Roanoke County.
R:!. xty d&.ys later X secured a judgment against Debtor for $25,000 vJhich was dnly
c o ~ketcd in the Clerkts Office of the Circuit Court of Roanoke County~ Shortly
thereafter X instituted a suit in ·t,he proper court to sell the farm in sat:\.sf-?.e:t:Lon
of the judgment. he had secured against Debtor. The court has referred the mat ter
to you as a commissioner in chancery to ascertain the liens against the fa:i.'m and
their respective priorities. The farm was worth only $30,000 , X has cont und sd l n
this proc3eding that A's deed of trust was void, as no note or bond eviden.:;:..!!g t he
$15~000 indebtedness had been delivered to A,
How ought you to report on the validity and priority of the asserted liens 0f
1
A and X'l
(CREDITORS RIGHTS) A's deed of trust has priority. It is the debt that is secm·ed.. not, th13 note evidencing the debt. Equity regards that as done whiL'h ought to have
been dope and will treat the transaction as if the note had been given&

3 June exam 1966.
1. John Pegram comes to see you and states that Mike Mack, a resident of Hanover
County, owes him $2,500, which is due on an unsecured loan made by Pegram to Mack
in 1964. Pegram also tells you that Mack has, refused to pay the loan, and that the
only asset owned by Mack is an underveloped and unencumbered parcel of land situated
in Hanover County. He asks you what steps, if any, he make take to have Mack's land
subjected to the payment of the $2,500 debt. What should your advice be?
(CREDITORS RI,GHTS) Pegram should bring an action at law against Me~k in the Hanover
Court for ~,500. The judgment in this action will be a specific :u. ~m on all of
Mack's land within Hanover County and Pegram can then file a bill in equity to enforce this lien. If the Chancellor determines that the rents and profits of all land
subject to the lien will not satisfy the judgment within five years, he may order a
sale of as much thereof as is necessary to discharge the judgment.(Note: Pegram
must obtain a judgment but need not exhaust his remedies at law before proceeding
against the land). 171 Va.l94, 176 Va. 16, Code 18-391.
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5~Sells Auto Supply Distributor of Richmond, Va., had been trying to induce Byers

•

•

•

Auto and Tire Shop, a retailer of Richmond, to purchase Sells' products consisting
of hydraulic jacks of a special deaign for use in Byer's tire-selling operation and
a new type non-skid automobile tire for resale to Byer's eustomers. Byers agreed to
purchase two hydraulic jacks at a purchase price of $200 each with the understanding
that he would try using them for thirty days to see if they fitted the needs of his
operation, and if so, he would pay for them, and i f not, they would be returned
to Sells at no cost to Byers. B,yers also agreed to purchase ten tires at a price of
$30 each for sale to the public at $50 each with the agreement that if he could not
sell all of the tires within thirty days, all unsold tires could be returned to
Sells with Byers paying only for those that had been sold.
Sells delivered the two jacks with an invoice marked 0 Sale on Approval" and the
ten tires with an invoice marked 0 0n Consignmentn, these being the only documents
of sale. Fifteen days after delivery, Sells made inquiry of Byer$ and was told that
Byer's employees liked the jacks and that they ~pparently would do the job but
Byers was not yet positive about purchasing the same, and Byers also advised that
three tires had been sold. The next day Crenshoaw, a judgment creditor of Byers,
for an amount exceeding the value of all the property on the premises, levied on
all of the property of Byers through proper proceedings. Sells, through proper proceedings, sought return of the two jacks or their value, and the seven tires or
their value, plus$90.00 that being the amount for which three of the tires had been
sold.
Is Sells entitled to: (l) return of the two jacks or value,
(b) return of the seven tires or value, and
(c) the payment of $90.
.
(CR&DITORS RIGHTS)(a) Yes, Sells is entitled to return of the two jacks or value.
8.2-326(2)(UCC) When ••• goods held on approval are not subject to the claims of
the buyer's creditors until acceptance.
That Sells printed, ttS&le on Approvaln on his invoice is immaterial; however,
this was a true "sale on approval" since the goods were delivered primarily for use
within 8.2-326(l)(a), and not for resale.
(b) No. Sells is not entitled to the return of the seven tires or value.
8.2-326(3) when goods are delivered to a person for sale and such person maintaine
a place of business at which he deals in goods of the kind involved, under a name
other than the name of the person making delivery, then with respect to calim of
creditors of the person conducting the business, the goods are deemed to be on
sale or return. The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though an
agreement purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until payment or
resale or uses such words as " on consignment" or rt on memorandum". 8.2-326(2)
••• goods held on sale or return are subjeot to such claims while in the buyer's
possession.
(c) No. Sells is a general creditor, as the sale has taken place •

3 December 1967
1))6/editor obtained a judgment for $30,000 against Debtor in the Circuit Court of
Wise County, Va., on which an execution was promptly issued and placed in the hands
of the sheriff of that County. The Clerk of the Court, however, failed to record the
judgaent on the judgment lien docket.
At the time the judgment was rendered, Debtor owned the followin g property:(l) a
store house in Wise County worth approximately $10,000,(2) a residence in that
County worth about $7,500 1 (3) a herd of cattle in Wise County worth about $10 1 000,
and (4) a bond of Farmer for $15,000.
After the execution went into the hands of the sheriff and before its return day,
Debtor (1) sold the store house for $9,500 cash to Merchant, who knew of the judgment,(2) ~onveyed the residence as a wedding present to his daughter, who knew
nothing of the judgment,()) sold the herd of cattle to Frazier, who knew nothing
about the judgment, and in whose possession the cattle were at the time the sheriff
l evied on them pursuant to the execution and,(4)collected the bond from Farmer, who
also knew of the judgment.
What are the rights, if any, of Creditor to subject the following property to the
satisfaction of his judgment:
(1) the store ho use, (2) the residence, (3) the cattle, and (4) what liability,
if any, rests on Farmer?
~~-

(CREDITORS RIGHTS) (1) Every judgment for money is a lien on realty of which the
defendant is possessed only from the time such judgment is recorded. V#8-386. Since
Creditor's judgment was never recorded, no lien attached to Debtor's land.
2. Though a gift is not void as to subsequent creditors, it is void as to prior
creditors. Hence creditor can reach the residence.
3. Creditor ~an get the cattle, as a writ of fieri facias on chattels binds those
chattels from the time it is delivered to an officer to be executed. V#B-411.
4. No liability rests on Farmer. ~s against a person making a payment to a judgment
debtor, a lien on intangibles shall not affect such person; unless and until he be
given notice thereof in writing. VIB-432.
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